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ABSTRACT
We study a two-sided matching problem where the agents
have independent pairwise preferences on their possible part-
ners and these preferences may be uncertain. In this case,
the certainly preferred part of an agent’s preferences may
admit a cycle and there may not even exist a matching that
is stable with non-zero probability. We focus on the compu-
tational problems of checking the existence of possibly and
certainly stable matchings, i.e., matchings whose probability
of being stable is positive or one, respectively. We show that
finding a possibly stable matching is NP-hard, even if only
one side can have cyclic preferences. On the other hand we
show that the problem of finding a certainly stable matching
is polynomial-time solvable if only one side can have cyclic
preferences and the other side has transitive preferences, but
that this problem becomes NP-hard when both sides can
have cyclic preferences. The latter complexity result also
implies the hardness of finding a kernel in a special class of
directed graphs.
CCS Concepts
•Theory of computation! Design and analysis of al-
gorithms; •Computing methodologies!Multi-agent
systems; •Applied computing ! Economics;
Keywords
Matching under preferences; stable matchings; pairwise com-
parisons; uncertain preferences
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a Stable Marriage problem (SM) in which
there are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of men and a set
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of women, and each agent is able to compare any two given
agents from the other side of the market. The goal is to
compute a stable matching µ, i.e., a matching where there is
no pair of a man and a woman that prefer to be matched to
each other rather than matched to their partners in µ. The
standard literature on stable matching problems [10, 12, 15]
usually assumes that the preferences are linear orders and
that agents are fully aware of their preferences. We relax
both of these assumptions. We assume that men and women
may have uncertainty in their preferences, and that the un-
derlying preferences need not be linear orders. Uncertainty
in preferences could arise for a number of reasons both prac-
tical or epistemological. For example, an agent may have not
invested enough time or e↵ort to come up with a linear order
or di↵erentiate any two potential partners.
In this paper, we focus on the pairwise probability model
where each agent only expresses a probability of preferring
one agent over another for all possible pairs. More formally,
each agent a is endowed with independent pairwise probabil-
ities for any given two partners b and c. If a prefers b to c
with probability p then s/he prefers c to b with probability
1   p. We suppose that each agent has complete pairwise
comparisons, and therefore we only consider complete match-
ings as solutions (where complete means that all agents are
matched). Uncertain pairwise preferences are a general model
of preferences that have been well-studied in the context of
voting. Pairwise uncertain preferences are also referred to
as fuzzy preferences (see e.g., [3]). Since, the preferences are
probabilistic, we will especially be interested in matching
that are stable with probability that is one or at least non-
zero. We will refer to stability probability as the probability
that a matching is stable.
Many of our results depend on the structure of the certainly
preferred relation that can be derived from the pairwise pref-
erences. We define the certainly preferred relation  certa for
each agent a and write b  certa c if and only if agent a prefers
b over c with probability 1. We assume that the certainly
preferred relation is not necessarily transitive. That is, it is
possible that a prefers b to c and c to d, both with probability
1, but prefers d to b with some nonzero probability. Moreover,
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the certainly preferred relation is also not necessarily acyclic.
In the previous example, if a prefers d to b with probability 1,
then the certainly preferred relation is cyclic. In such a case
it may happen that any matching will be certainly blocked.
Example 1. We have three men m1, m2 and m3 and
three women w1, w2 and w3. For every two agents on one
side of the market, each agent of the other side assigns a
probability to preferring one over another, as depicted in
Table 1.
This setting admits six complete matchings listed in Table
2 along with their stability probabilities. We can extract the
certainly preferred relation from the preferences as follows:
m1 : ;;
m2 : {w2  certm2 w1, w1  certm2 w3};
m3 : {w2  certm3 w1, w1  certm3 w3};
w1 : {m2  certw1 m1,m1  certw1 m3,m2  certw1 m3};
w2 : {m1  certw2 m3,m2  certw2 m3}; and
w3 : {m1  certw3 m3,m2  certw3 m3}.
Understanding this relation simplifies the computation as
we know certain pairs will not have positive probability of
blocking. For the men, m2 and m3 both certainly prefer w2
to w1, and w1 to w3, and both have positive probability on
w3 w2, which could lead to a cyclic preference. For the
women, w1 has a strict linear order over the agents, while
w2 and w3 both only have uncertainty over the relationship
between m1 and m2, but are sure m3 is the worst and hence
there is no chance for a cycle.
In order to compute the probability that µ1 is stable
we have to compute the probability that none of the
potential blocking pairs occurs. Specifically we compute
the probability of each of the potential blocking pairs occurring:
p(m1, w2) = p(w2 m1w1) · p(m1 w2m2) = 0.6 · 0.8 = 0.48,
p(m1, w3) = p(w3 m1w1) · p(m1 w3m3) = 0.8 · 1.0 = 0.8,
p(m2, w1) = p(w1 m2w2) · p(m2 w1m1) = 0.0 · 1.0 = 0.0,
p(m2, w3) = p(w3 m2w2) · p(m2 w3m3) = 0.5 · 1.0 = 0.5,
p(m3, w1) = p(w1 m3w3) · p(m3 w1m1) = 1.0 · 0.0 = 0.0,
p(m3, w2) = p(w2 m3w3) · p(m3 w2m2) = 0.5 · 0.0 = 0.0.
The probability that µ1 is stable is the probability that no
blocking pair exists. Since each blocking pair occurs indepen-
dently we can compute this as the probability that no blocking
pair occurs independently: (1  p(m1, w2)) · (1  p(m1, w3)) ·
. . . · (1  p(m3, w2)) = (1  0.48) · (1  0.8) · (1  0.5) = 0.052.
It can be easily verified that matchings µ2, µ4, and µ5 have
stability probability 0 since (m2, w1), (m2, w1), and (m2, w2),
form blocking pairs with probability 1 for these matchings,
respectively.
Men Women
m1 p(w1 m1w2) = 0.4
p(w2 m1w3) = 0.6
p(w1 m1w3) = 0.2
w1 p(m1 w1m2) = 0.0
p(m2 w1m3) = 1.0
p(m1 w1m3) = 1.0
m2 p(w1 m2w2) = 0.0
p(w2 m2w3) = 0.5
p(w1 m2w3) = 1.0
w2 p(m1 w2m2) = 0.8
p(m2 w2m3) = 1.0
p(m1 w2m3) = 1.0
m3 p(w1 m3w2) = 0.0
p(w2 m3w3) = 0.5
p(w1 m3w3) = 1.0
w3 p(m1 w3m2) = 0.2
p(m2 w3m3) = 1.0
p(m1 w3m3) = 1.0
Table 1: Pairwise probabilities for the agents in Ex-
ample 1.
Matching
Stability
Probability
µ1 {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)} 0.052
µ2 {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)} 0.0
µ3 {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)} 0.48
µ4 {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)} 0.0
µ5 {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)} 0.0
µ6 {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)} 0.2496
Table 2: Stability probability for each matching in
Example 1.
Computational Problems.
Given a stable marriage setting where agents have uncer-
tain preferences, various natural computational problems
arise. Beside computing the stability probability of a match-
ing, the other important problem is finding a matching that
is “most stable.”We can think of two (not necessarily equiva-
lent) criteria. One is to find a matching that has the highest
probability of being stable, and the other is to find a match-
ing that has the minimum expected number of blocking pairs.
In this paper we mainly focus on the former and leave the
latter for future work. We consider the following problems
for the pairwise probability model.
• StabilityProbability: Given a matching and uncer-
tain preferences of the agents, what is the stability
probability of the matching?
• MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability:
Given uncertain preferences of the agents, compute a
matching with highest stability probability.
We additionally consider problems connected to, and more
restricted than, MatchingWithHighestStabilityProb-
ability: (1) ExistsCertainlyStableMatching — Does
there exist a matching that has stability probability one?
(2) ExistsPossiblyStableMatching — Does there exist a
matching that has non-zero stability probability?
Results.
We summarize the central complexity results of this paper
in Table 3. In particular, in Theorem 2 we show that Ex-
istsPossiblyStableMatching is NP-complete, even if one
side has cyclic certainly preferred relations. With a slight ex-
tension of this theorem, in Theorem 3 we also obtain the NP-
hardness of MatchingWithHighestStabilityProb even
if no agent has cycle in her/his certainly preferred relations.
ExistsCertainlyStableMatching is polynomial-time solv-
able as long as the certainly preferred relation is transitive for
at least one side of the market (Theorem 5). Otherwise, if the
certainly preferred relation can be cyclic on both sides of the
market, then the problem is NP-hard (Theorem 4). Finally,
we show how the latter result implies the NP-hardness of the
kernel checking problem for a special class of directed graphs
(Theorem 8).
Related work.
Aziz et al. [1, 2] studied matching problems under un-
certain preferences, but only considered linear models. In a
linear model the agents have linear preferences over their
potential partners which are realized with some probabilities.
Three cases were studied. In the lottery model each agent
has an independent probability distribution over her possible
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Computational problems transitive|transitive transitive|cyclic cyclic|cyclic
ExistsPossiblyStableMatching in P [trivial] NP-complete [Thm 2] NP-complete
ExistsCertainlyStableMatching in P in P [Thm 5] NP-complete [Thm 4]
MatchingWithHighestStabilityProb NP-hard [Thm 3] NP-hard NP-hard
Table 3: Summary of results under di↵erent assumptions over the certainly preferred relations on the two
sides, where ‘transitive’ means that the certainly preferred relations are transitive and cyclic means that
preference cycle may occur in the certainly preferred relation of an agent.
preferences. In the compact indi↵erence model these probabil-
ity distributions come from weak preferences where the ties
are broken by uniform random lotteries. Finally, the so-called
joint probability model allows a probability distribution over
complete preference profiles. The model of uncertain pair-
wise preferences, that we study in this paper, is conceptually
di↵erent. Here, we assume that the agents have uncertain
pairwise comparisons over their potential partners, and these
comparisons are independent of each other. To illustrate
the significant di↵erence between the linear and pairwise
models, let us describe a simple example. Suppose that we
have a man m who is completely indi↵erent among three
women w1, w2, and w3. In our linear models this situation
would be described with uniform probabilities over the six
potential linear orders on the three women. In particular, the
probability that matching m with w1 is stable for this small
instance would be 13 , as w1 is the best partner of m in two
of the six equal probability orders. However, in our pairwise
probability model the man would have 0.5 probability of
preferring any woman to another one. But note that these
probabilities are independent from each other. Therefore
the probability of the matching {(m,w1)} being stable is
1
2 · 12 = 14 . This conceptual di↵erence makes it necessary to
use di↵erent approaches when studying the pairwise model.
A general model based on (certain) pairwise comparisons
was studied in a recent paper by Farczadi, Georgiou and
Ko¨nemann [6]. They suppose that the agents on one side of
the market have complete linear preferences and the agents
on the other side can have arbitrary binary relations for any
pair of partners. They interpret this relation as one potential
partner being at least as good as the other potential partner
for the agent concerned. They define stability in the following
way: if two agents are not matched then either of them should
be matched to a partner that is at least as good as this
potential blocking partner. Their model di↵ers from ours
in many aspects, as they do not use probabilities and they
allow antisymmetric relations and no relation for a pair of
potential partners, and they only consider the case when one
side has pairwise comparisons. Nevertheless, in our proof for
the NP-completeness of the problem of deciding the existence
of a possibly stable matching for the case where one side may
have cyclic preferences (Theorem 2), we use a proof that is
similar to the one given by Farczadi et al. [6] for the problem
of finding a stable matching in their context.
2. PRELIMINARIES
The classical setting of a Stable Marriage problem is defined
as follows. There are two sets of agents: a set M of n men
and a set W of n women. We use the term agents when
making statements that apply to both men and women, and
the term candidates to refer to the agents on the opposite
side of the market to that of an agent under consideration.
Each agent a has a preference ordering over the candidates,
where c1  a c2 denotes that a prefers c1 over c2.
Contrary to the classical definition, we assume that agents’
preferences are described as independent pairwise compar-
isons on their possible partners, and that these preferences
may be uncertain. Let L denote the uncertain pairwise pref-
erence profile for all agents. We denote by I = (M,W,L)
an instance of a stable marriage problem with uncertain
pairwise preferences.
A matching µ is a pairing of men and women such that
each man is paired with at most one woman and vice versa;
defining a list of (man, woman) pairs (m,w). We use µ(m)
to denote the woman w that is matched to m and µ(w) to
denote the match for w. If an agent a is unmatched, we
let µ(a) = ?. The probability that a matching is stable is
the probability that there exists no pair (m,w) /2 µ where
m prefers w to his current partner in µ, i.e., w  m µ(m),
and vice versa. If such a pair exists, it constitutes a blocking
pair ; as the pair would prefer to defect and match with each
other rather than stay with their partner in µ. A matching
is certainly stable if it is stable with probability 1.
The Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete
lists (SMTI) is an extension of SM, where agents are allowed
to declare some candidates unacceptable—i.e. they strictly
prefer remaining unmatched to pairing with an unacceptable
partner, and have weak orders over acceptable candidates. A
matching is individually rational if no agent is matched to
an unacceptable partner. Every agent a strictly prefers being
matched to an acceptable candidate to remaining unmatched.
A matching is called weakly stable if it is individually rational
and there is no strongly blocking pair, consisting of two
agents who strictly prefer each other to their partners in
the matching. A matching is super-stable if it is individually
rational and there is no weakly blocking pair who both weakly
prefer each other to their current partners. A weakly stable
matching always exists, but Manlove et al. [13] proved that
deciding whether an SMTI instance has a complete weakly
stable matching is NP-hard. Super-stable matching may not
exist, but deciding the existence can be done e ciently.
The Stable Marriage problem with Partially ordered lists
(SMP) is another extension of SM in which agents’ prefer-
ences are partial orders over the candidates. In SMP with
Incomplete lists (SMPI), each agent’s partially ordered prefer-
ences contains only his/her acceptable candidates. A match-
ing is super-stable in an instance of SMPI if it is stable w.r.t.
all linear extensions of the partially ordered preferences.
The main observation in this section is that stability prob-
ability of a matching can be checked easily.
Theorem 1. For the pairwise probabilities model, Stabil-
ityProbability is polynomial-time solvable.
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Proof. We can compute the probability that a given
matching µ is stable as follows. The probability pb(m,w)
that a given blocking pair (m,w) exists is equal to the proba-
bility that m prefers w over his current match in µ multiplied
by the probability that w prefers m over her current match
in µ. Both these probabilities are given in the pairwise prob-
abilities model. Then the probability that a given blocking
pair (m,w) does not exist is 1  pb(m,w). The probability
that no blocking pair exists is
Q
(m,w)2M⇥W (1  pb(m,w)).
Note that the probability that no blocking pair exists is equal
to the probability that µ is stable.
3. POSSIBLY STABLE MATCHINGS
When the certainly preferred relation is acyclic, the prob-
lem of checking whether there exists a matching with non-zero
probability of being stable is trivial: for each agent, a linear
extension consistent with the certainly preferred relation can
be taken and for such a preference profile, a stable matching
exists due to the classic result of Gale and Shapley [9]. If
the certainly preferred relation is not acyclic, a possibly sta-
ble matching does not necessarily exist. We first show that
the problem of deciding whether a possibly stable matching
exists is NP-complete.
Theorem 2. For the pairwise probabilities model, Exist-
sPossiblyStableMatching is NP-complete, even if one
side of the market has deterministic linear preferences.
Proof. Since computing StabilityProbability can be
solved in polynomial time, we can check e ciently whether a
given matching has positive probability, so the problem is in
NP. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from the problem of
deciding whether an instance of SMTI admits a complete sta-
ble matching. Our reduction is similar to a reduction used by
Farczadi et al. [6, Theorem 1] for a di↵erent problem. Because
some details are adjusted, we describe it here completely.
In [13], Manlove et al. proved that determining if an instance
of SMTI admits a complete stable matching is NP-complete,
even if the ties appear only on the women’s side, and each
woman’s preference list is either strictly ordered or consists
entirely of a tie of size two. Let M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}
be the set of men and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be the set
of women in an SMTI instance I, where we suppose that
the men’s preferences are strict. We create an instance I 0
of pairwise probability model as follows. We extend the set
of men with three new men, mn+1, mn+2 and mn+3, and
likewise extend the set of women with three new women
wn+1, wn+2 and wn+3. We refer to the acceptable partners
of any given agent a in I as his/her proper partners in I 0. For
each man mi (i 2 [n]) in the original instance, we extend his
strict preference ordering on his proper partners arbitrarily,
by appending the three new women and his unacceptable
candidates in I in some arbitrary order. For every woman
wi (i 2 [n]) in the original instance, we create the pairwise
preferences as follows. Firstly, wi prefers every proper part-
ner of hers to the rest, i.e., to every new man and every
unacceptable candidate in I. Secondly, wi prefers each of the
three new men to those men who were unacceptable to her
in I. The pairwise preferences of wi over her proper partners
are created in the following natural way: wi certainly prefers
mk to ml if wi strictly prefers mk to ml in I, and if wi is
indi↵erent between mk and ml in I then we set the corre-
sponding pairwise probability to be 0.5 in I 0. We then let
the pairwise preferences of wi over the three new men to be
cyclic, i.e., wi prefers mn+1 to mn+2, mn+2 to mn+3, and
mn+3 to mn+1. The preferences of wi over the unacceptable
original candidates are arbitrary. What remains is to define
the pairwise preferences of the new agents. Let each of the
three new men have all the original women at the top of his
preference list ordered according to their indices, followed
with wn+1, wn+2 and wn+3 (in this order). As for the three
new women, let them have mn+1, mn+2 and mn+3 in the top
of their strict preference lists, followed by the original men
in an arbitrary order. (Note that every complete linear order
implies pairwise probability preferences). We claim that there
exists a complete weakly stable matching in I if and only if
there is a matching with positive stability probability in I 0.
To see the first direction, let µ be a complete weakly stable
matching in I. It is easy to see that if we extend µ with
pairs (mn+1, wn+1), (mn+2, wn+2) and (mn+3, wn+3) then
the resulting matching µ0 has positive probability of being
stable in I 0. This is because, as it is easy to verify, there
is no pair which would be certainly blocking for µ0. In the
other direction, suppose that µ0 is a complete matching in I 0
that has positive probability of being stable (i.e., it has no
certainly blocking pair). First we show that every original
woman has to be matched with a proper partner. Suppose for
a contradiction that wi is the woman with the smallest index
who is not matched to a proper partner. If wi is matched to
an original man who was unacceptable to her in I then wi
would form a certainly blocking pair with any of the three
new men. To see this, note that wi certainly prefers either of
the three new men to her partner, and as none of the new men
are matched to a original woman with index smaller than i,
hence they all certainly prefer wi to their partners. Suppose
now that wi is matched to one of the three new men. Then
wi would form a certainly blocking pair with the subsequent
new man according to her cyclical preference. (For instance,
if wi is matched to mn+1 in µ
0 then she forms a certainly
blocking pair with mn+3.) This is because the subsequent
new man cannot have any better partner, since all the women
with smaller indices than i are matched to a proper partner.
So we arrive at the conclusion that every original woman
is matched with a proper partner. As µ0 does not admit a
certainly blocking pair, this conclusion implies that all the
original women are matched to a proper partner in such a
way that there is no certainly blocking pair involving original
agents. Thus by restricting µ0 to the original agents we arrive
at a matching µ that must be weakly stable and complete
for I.
The above result gives us the following corollary.
Theorem 3. MatchingWithHighestStabilityPro-
bability is NP-hard, even if the certainly preferred relation
is transitive for one side of the market and the other side
has deterministic linear orders.
Proof. We adjust the proof of Theorem 2, as follows.
Suppose that I was the starting instance of SMTI, I 0 was the
corresponding instance of pairwise model with certain cyclic
preferred relations, and let the adjusted instance of the pair-
wise model be denoted by I 00. Whenever some women had
cyclic certainly preferred relations in I 0, we now modify the
probabilities in these pairwise comparisons by a su ciently
small ✏ value. That is, whenever a woman wi certainly pre-
ferred a man mk to another man ml belonging to a certain
preference cycle in I 0, we set p(mk wiml) = 1   ✏ in I 00.
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Thus, we have no certainly preferred relations in any cycle in
I 00. However, when considering the matching with the highest
stability probability in I 00, we can still separate between the
two cases with regard to the original NP-complete problem
for I. To see this, suppose first that we have a complete
stable matching for I. In this case this matching extended
with the three new pairs in I 0 will have a probability of being
stable at least 12n in both I
0 and I 00. This is because every
woman who is indi↵erent between some men has at most one
tie of length two in her preference list in I, and so if this
woman is matched to one of the men in her tie then only
the other man in this tie may block, which happens with 0.5
probability (if that man prefers this woman to his matching
partner). On the other hand, if there exists no complete
stable matching for I then we have shown in the proof of
Theorem 2 that there always existed a certain blocking pair
in I 0. This certain blocking pair now will have a probability
of 1  ✏ to be blocking, implying that any matching in this
case has less than ✏ probability of being stable. Therefore, if
we choose ✏ to be 0 < ✏ < 12n then an algorithm which solves
MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability could also
be used to decide the existence of a complete stable matching
for SMTI e ciently.
4. CERTAINLY STABLE MATCHINGS
In this section we focus on matchings that are sta-
ble with probability one and study the ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching problem. As we will see, its com-
plexity depends on whether one or both sides can have cyclic
preferences.
4.1 Hardness result
We first show that ExistsCertainlyStableMatching
is NP-complete in the general model where both sides may
have cyclic preferences, even if all agents are certain.
Theorem 4. ExistsCertainlyStableMatching is NP-
complete, even if all agents are certain.
Proof. Checking whether a matching is stable can be
done in linear time, so the problem is in NP. To prove NP-
hardness, we reduce from the 3-SAT problem. We are given an
instance B of 3-SAT with a set of variables V = {v1, . . . , vn}
and clauses C = {c1, . . . , cm}. We create an instance I of
the pairwise probability model with certain and intransitive
preferences, as follows. (Since all the preferences will be
certain, for simplicity, instead of b  certa c, we write b  a c if
agent a prefers b over c with probability 1.) For each variable,
vi we create a simple gadget Gi involving six agents ai, ai,
ti, fi, t
0
i and f
0
i and the following set of so-called proper pairs
Ei = {aiti, tiai, aifi, fiai, tit0i, fif 0i}. For each clause Cj , we
create another gadget G0j with six agents mj,1, mj,2, mj,3,
wj,1, wj,2, wj,3, where all the pairs are proper. Finally, if
literal vi appears in clause Cj then ti andmj,1 is a proper pair
and if literal vi appears in Cj then fi and mj,1 form a proper
pair. The core of the variable gadget Gi is a length four
preference cycle, with the following pairwise comparisons.
ti  ai fi; ai  ti ai; fi  ai ti; ai  fi ai
For this sub-instance, we have two stable matchings, Ti =
{aiti, aifi} and Fi = {aifi, aiti}, which will correspond to the
cases of setting vi to be true or false in the truth assignment,
respectively.
For the clause gadget G0j , we set the preferences as in
the classical Gale-Shapley instance [9] with three men, three
women and three stable matchings. Namely, let the linear
preferences of these agents to be
wj,1  mj,1 wj,2  mj,1 wj,3; mj,2  wj,1 mj,3  wj,1 mj,1;
wj,2  mj,2 wj,3  mj,2 wj,1; mj,3  wj,2 mj,1  wj,2 mj,2;
wj,3  mj,3 wj,1  mj,3 wj,2; mj,1  wj,3 mj,2  wj,3 mj,3;
We have three stable matchings:
µ1j = {mj,1wj,1,mj,2wj,2,mj,3wj,3},
µ2j = {mj,1wj,2,mj,2wj,3,mj,3wj,1}, and
µ3j = {mj,1wj,3,mj,2wj,1,mj,3wj,2}.
Now we set the preferences over the linking pairs of the
forms timj,1 and fimj,1. For the agent in the variable gadget,
these partners are in the middle of the preferences, as follows:
ai  ti mj,1;mj,1  ti ai; ai  fi mj,1;mj,1  fi ai.
Note that these pairwise comparisons are intransitive for
ti regarding partners ai, ai and mj,1. For mj,1, if the literal
vi appears in the kth place in the clause (for k 2 {1, 2, 3})
then let mj,1 have the following pairwise comparisons:
ti  mj,1 wj,k;wj,k+1(mod3)  mj,1 ti;wj,k+2(mod3)  mj,1 ti.
The intuition behind this setting is the following. If variable
vi is set to be true and vi appears as the kth literal in clause
Cj then we can choose matching µ
k
j in gadget G
0
j without
making pair timj,1 blocking. Similarly, if literal vi appears in
Cj (i.e., when fi is linked to mj,1) then we set the preferences
of mj,1 as follows:
fi  mj,1 wj,k;wj,k+1(mod3)  mj,1 fi;wj,k+2(mod3)  mj,1 fi.
Therefore here as well, if variable vi is set to be false and vi
appears as the k-th literal in clause Cj then we can choose
matching µkj in gadget G
0
j without making pair fimj,1 block-
ing. Furthermore, the other pairs of forms timj,1 and fimj,1
won’t be blocking either, as they correspond to the other two
literals, for which mj,1 prefers wj,k over ti (or fi).
With regard to the proper pairs of form tit
0
i and fif
0
i , we
only use them to forbid any pair of form timj,1 and fimj,1
to be included in a stable matching. Namely, we set
ai  ti t0i; ai  ti t0i
and for any pair timj,1 we set
t0i  ti mj,1.
Similarly, we set
ai  fi f 0i ; ai  fi f 0i
and for any pair fimj,1 we set
f 0i  fi mj,1.
Finally, we let t0i and f
0
i form a proper pair, with new
agents t00i and f
00
i , respectively. We let t
0
i prefer ti to t
00
i and
f 0i prefer fi to f
00
i . All the other pairs are not proper and
we suppose that all agents want to get a proper partner and
their preferences over the not proper partners are arbitrary.
We are ready to show that B has a truth assignment if
and only if there exist a (certainly) stable matching in I.
Suppose first that we are given a truth assignment, then we
create the matching µ in I as we already described above.
Namely, if vi is set to be true then we add Ti to µ in the
variable gadget Gi and when vi is false then we add Fi to µ.
Regarding the clause gadgets G0j , we choose a literal that is
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true according to the truth assignment (there must be one,
say, the kth one), then we add µkj to µ. Finally we match t
0
i
to t00i and f
0
i to f
00
i for every i. This matching is stable, as
argued above.
In the other direction, suppose that I has a (certainly)
stable matching µ. As we discussed when describing the
construction, no pair of forms timj,1 and fimj,1 may be in µ,
because a corresponding pair tit
0
i or fif
0
i would be blocking.
Similarly, no pair of forms tit
0
i and fif
0
i can be present in
µ, as otherwise some pair in Ei would be blocking. After
ignoring these pairs we can observe that every agent is the
first choice of some proper partner, therefore the matching
must consist of proper pairs. Thus either Ti or Fi must be in
µ, and also one of the three possible stable matching, µ1j , µ
2
j
or µ3j must be chosen in G
0
j for µ. We then assign the values
in the Boolean formula according to the matchings in the
variable gadgets, namely, we set vi to be true if Ti ⇢ µ and
false if Fi ⇢ µ. This will be a truth assignment, since if µkj is
chosen for any clause gadget G0j then the kth literal must be
true in clause Cj , as otherwise the corresponding pair, timj,1
or fimj,1 would block matching µ.
4.2 Tractability for transitivity on one side
We present an e cient algorithm for ExistsCer-
tainlyStableMatching for the case when one side must
have transitive certainly preferred relations, but there is no
constraint on the preferences of the other side. In Aziz et al.
[2] it was shown that certainly stable matchings are closely
related to the notion of super-stable matchings widely stud-
ied in the literature [14]. In fact they were able to provide a
definition of certainly stable matchings using a terminology
similar to that of super-stability. Given a matching µ and
an unmatched pair (m,w), a pair (m,w) very weakly blocks
(blocks) µ if µ(m) 6 certm w and µ(w) 6 certw m.
Proposition 1 ([2]). A matching is certainly stable i↵
it admits no very weakly blocking pair.
It directly follows from a result by Aziz et al. [2] (Theo-
rem 1) that if the certainly preferred relation is transitive for
both sides of the market, then employing the SUPER-SMP
algorithm of [14] leads to a polynomial time algorithm for
ExistsCertainlyStableMatching. Here we show that by
making changes to SUPER-SMP we can relax our assumption
to require transitivity on only one side of the market. Without
loss of generality we assume that the certainly preferred rela-
tion is transitive for men. Algorithm CERTAINLY-STABLE
depicted as Algorithm 1 is a modification of SUPER-SMP.
The main ideas behind the algorithm and the proofs are
similar to those presented in [14], but we have adapted them
to our problem as well as managing to shorten and simplify
some of the proofs.
We begin with providing an intuitive high-level descrip-
tion of what Algorithm 1 does. Let pm denote the certainly
preferred relation for each man m. Since every agent finds all
candidates acceptable, he or she certainly prefers every can-
didate to remaining unmatched. To start with, every agent is
set free, i.e. not engaged. The algorithm conducts a series of
proposals by men to women. A man m proposes to a woman
w if w is at the head of pm (defined in the next paragraph)
and m and w are not engaged to each other. If w certainly
prefers m to her current fiance´ (if she has one) and every man
she as rejected so far, then w breaks her current engagement
(if any exists) and m and w become engaged. Otherwise, w
rejects m. Furthermore, if w has a fiance´ m0, then she will
break her engagement with m0 if she does not certainly prefer
m0 to m. Notice that when a woman rejects a man, or breaks
her engagement with a man, it has become evident that they
cannot be matched in a certainly stable matching. Also note
that during the execution of the algorithm, each woman is
engaged to at most one man, but a man may be engaged
to several women. When there is no more proposals to be
made—i.e., when every manm is engaged to all women at the
head of pm—the current engagement relation is examined to
determine whether it qualifies as a certainly stable matching
or not. It qualifies if no man is engaged to more than one
women—i.e., if it is a matching, and there is no woman who
has received a proposal and is remained unmatched.
We now define the terms used in Algorithm 1. When we say
delete the pair (m,w), we mean that w should be deleted from
the certainly preferred relation pm (deletion of m from w’s
preferences is not necessary for the purpose of Algorithm 1).
A pair (m,w) is deleted if w rejects m immediately after he
has made a proposal, or breaks her engagement with m later
on. For the ease of the presentation we say that w rejects m
in either case. For any agent x, we refer to x’s preferences at
the termination of Algorithm 1 as x’s reduced preferences. At
any stage of the algorithm, we say a woman w is at the head
of a man m’s certainly preferred relation if there is no other
woman in m’s remaining certainly preferred relation (i.e.,
no woman who is not deleted from pm) whom m certainly
prefers to w. Note that as the certainly preferred relation is
transitive, and therefore acyclic, for men, as long as there
is a woman who has not yet been deleted from pm, there is
at least one woman at the head of m’s certainly preferred
relation. Also note that more than one woman can be at the
head of m’s certainly preferred relation.
Theorem 5. ExistsCertainlyStableMatching can be
solved in polynomial time, if the certainly preferred relation
is transitive for at least one side of the market.
We prove Theorem 5 by showing that if an instance I
admits a certainly stable matching then Algorithm 1 returns
one, and if no matching is certainly stable in I then Algo-
rithm 1 returns false. Several lemmas will come in handy.
Lemma 1. If the pair (m,w) is deleted during an execution
of the algorithm, then the pair cannot block any matching
output by the algorithm.
Proof. Assume that CERTAINLY-STABLE outputs µ
as a certainly stable matching, and suppose that (m,w)
is deleted during an execution of the algorithm. Since w
has received proposals, the algorithm does not output a
matching in which she is unmatched. Since we assume that
the algorithm outputs a matching µ, hence w is matched
to say m0. We show that w must certainly prefer m0 to m.
To see this, consider the following two cases that can occur.
Case 1: If m0 proposes to w after (m,w) is deleted, or when
w is engaged to m, then w would not have accepted m0 if she
does not certainly prefer m0 to m (see the IF-THEN-ELSE
condition of line 11). Case 2: Else, m must have proposed to
w when m0 and w are engaged. In this case w would have
broken the engagement if she does not certainly prefer m0 to
m (see the IF-THEN-ELSE condition of line 18). So we have
established the fact that w certainly prefers m0, her partner
in µ, to m, implying that (m,w) cannot block µ.
349
Algorithm 1 Algorithm CERTAINLY-STABLE
Input: I = (M,W,L) where the certainly preferred relation is transitive for men. We assume that every agent certainly prefers
every candidate over null. Let pm denote the certainly preferred relation for each man m. We say that a woman w is at the
head of a man m’s certainly preferred relation if there is no other woman whom m certainly prefers to w.
Output: Matching µ that is certainly stable in I, or false
1 µ(w)   ? for all w 2W {Fiance´ of w, null to start with.}
2 F (m)   ; for all m 2M {Set of women engaged to m}
3 R(w)   ; for all w 2W {Set of men rejected by w}
4 R(m)   ; for all m 2M {Set of women who have rejected m}
5 for all w 2W do
6 proposed(w) false
7 end for
8 while some man m has a woman w at the head of pm to whom he is not engaged do
9 m proposes to w
10 proposed(w)  true
11 if m  certw m0 for each m0 2 R(w) [ {µ(w)} then
12 if µ(w) 6= ? then
13 F (µ(w)) = F (µ(w)) \ {w}; R(w) = R(w) [ {µ(w)}; R(µ(w)) = R(µ(w)) [ {w}; delete(µ(w), w)
{delete(µ(w), w) means that w should be deleted from pm.}
14 end if
15 F (m) = F (m) [ {w}; µ(w) = m
{If m is certainly more preferred to all the men w has rejected so far, as well as her current fiance´ if she has one, then (i) if w is
engaged she breaks her current engagement and subsequently is removed from her current fiance´’s certainly preferred relation,
and (ii) becomes engaged to m.}
16 else
17 R(w) = R(w) [ {m}; R(m) = R(m) [ {w}; delete(m,w)
{m’s proposal is rejected by w and subsequently w is removed from p(m).}
18 if µ(w) 6= ? and m0 = µ(w) 6 certw m then
19 F (m0) = F (m0) \ {w}; µ(w) = ?; R(w) = R(w) [ {m0}; R(m0) = R(m0) [ {w}; delete(m0, w)
20 end if
{If w is engaged and she does not certainly prefer her fiance´ m0 to m, she breaks the engagement and subsequently is removed
from p(m0).}
21 end if
22 end while
23 if (there is a man m such that |F (m)| > 1) or (there is a woman w such that µ(w) = ? and proposed(w) =true) then
24 return false
25 else
26 return µ
27 end if
We say that a pair (m,w) is a certainly-stable pair if m
and w are matched together in at least one certainly stable
matching.
Lemma 2. No certainly-stable pair is deleted during the
execution of the algorithm.
Proof. Assume otherwise for a contradiction. Let (m,w)
be the first certainly-stable pair deleted during the execution
of the algorithm. Let µ⇤ be a certainly stable matching in
which m and w are matched together.
Deletion of (m,w) can only occur under the following three
scenarios. Case 1: w is engaged to m and receives a proposal
from a manm0 whom she strictly prefers tom and all the men
she has already rejected, in which case the deletion occurs
in line 13. Case 2: w receives a proposal from m, and there
is a man m0 2 R(w) [ {µ(w)} to whom w does not certainly
prefer m, in which case the deletion occurs in line 17. (ase 3:
w is engaged to m and receives a proposal from a man m0
to whom she does not strictly prefer m, in which case the
deletion occurs in line 19. In all three cases, m0 cannot have
a certainly-stable partner w0 whom he certainly prefers to w;
for then the certainly-stable pair (m0, w0) would have been
deleted before (m,w) during the execution of the algorithm, a
contradiction. Therefore m0 does not certainly prefer µ⇤(m0)
to w. Hence (m0, w) blocks µ⇤, a contradiction.
Claim 6. If Algorithm 1 returns a matching µ then µ is
certainly stable in I.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that µ is not certainly
stable. Therefore there exits a pair (m,w) that blocks µ; i.e.,
µ(m) 6 certm w and µ(w) 6 certw m. It follows Lemma 1 that
(m,w) is not deleted. If w  certm µ(m), then for m to propose
to µ(m) he must have already been rejected by w (or else
µ(m) is not at the head of m’s certainly preferred relation),
and consequently (m,w) is deleted, a contradiction. Hence
neither µ(m) nor w is certainly preferred to one another
by m. If after the execution of the while loop w is at the
head of m’s certainly preferred relation, then m must have
proposed to her and be engaged to her as well, a contradiction
(as m is only engaged to one woman or else the algorithm
returns “false”). So it remains that w is not at the head of m’s
certainly preferred relation. Therefore, as certainly preferred
relation is transitive for men and µ(m) 6 certm w, there must
be a woman w⇤, besides µ(m), at the head of m’s certainly
preferred relation, implying that m must have proposed to
her and be engaged to her as well, a contradiction.
Claim 7. If I admits a certainly stable matching, then
Algorithm 1 returns one.
Proof. By Lemma 2 no certainly-stable pair is deleted
during the execution of the algorithm. Therefore, at the
termination of the while loop, each man m has in his reduced
preferences all women w where (m,w) is a certainly-stable
pair. Hence each m who is matched in some certainly stable
matching is engaged in F to all women at the head of pm.
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Each woman w is engaged to at most one man as no woman
keeps more than one fiance´.
We show that if either of the conditions in line 23 hold
then I cannot admit any certainly stable matching. Assume,
for a contradiction, that a certainly stable matching µ⇤ exists
and the algorithm returns “false”.
First assume that there is a woman w who has received at
least one proposal and is not engaged (µ(w) = ?). Say man
m proposed to her during the execution of the algorithm
and was rejected. Suppose first that w is unmatched in µ⇤.
As m has proposed to her, thus there is no woman in m’s
reduced preferences (which includes all his certainly-stable
partners and hence µ⇤(m)) whom he certainly prefers to w.
Therefore, (m,w) blocks µ⇤, a contradiction. Now suppose
that w is matched in µ⇤ to say m1 (m1 6= m as (m,w) is
removed and no certainly-stable pair is removed). As w is
not engaged hence she is not at the head of p(m1). Let w1
be a woman at the head of p(m1), implying that m1 does
not certainly prefer w to w1. If w1 is unmatched in µ
⇤ then
(m1, w1) blocks µ
⇤, a contradiction, thus w1 is matched in
µ⇤ to say m2 and she certainly prefers m2 to m1 (or else
(m1, w1) blocks µ
⇤). As each woman is engaged to at most
one man, and w1 is engaged to m1, hence w1 is not engaged
to m2 implying that she is not at the head of p(m2). Thus
there must be a woman, say w2, who is at the head of p(m2).
Applying the same arguments as we used for w1, we deduce
that w2 is matched in µ
⇤ to say m3, she certainly prefers
m3 to m2 and she is not at the head of p(m3), implying
that there is another woman at the head of p(m3). We can
continue with this argument, and as the number of men and
women are finite we shall at some point encounter a man or
a woman twice. Take the first time an agent is visited for the
second time. If it’s a man, this implies that he is matched
to two di↵erent women in µ⇤, a contradiction to µ⇤ being a
matching. If it’s a woman, this implies that she is engaged
to more than one man, a contradiction.
Now assume that each woman who has received at least one
proposal is engaged at the end of the while loop. Denote the
set of men and women engaged by MF and WF respectively.
Suppose that |F (m)| > 1 for at least one man m (i.e., m
is engaged to two or more women), thus |MF | < |WF |. As
no certainly-stable pair is removed (Lemma 2), any man
who is not in MF cannot be matched in any certainly stable
matching. This fact, combined by |MF | < |WF |, implies that
in any certainly stable matching some woman in WF remains
unmatched. Suppose w 2WF is unmatched in µ⇤. Let m be
the man to whom w is engaged (w 2 F (m)). As m is engaged
to w, w must be at the head of p(m). Therefore m does not
certainly prefer any of his certainly-stable partners, including
µ⇤(m), to w. Thus, (m,w) blocks µ⇤, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5. At most n2 proposals are made
during the execution of Algorithm 1. Using suitable data
structures, the computation of p, computation of the head
of men’s certainly preferred relations, and deletions can be
done in polynomial time. Hence Claims 6 and 7 complete the
proof of Theorem 5.
5. COROLLARY ON GRAPH KERNELS
In this section we describe how Theorem 4 directly implies
the NP-hardness of the graph kernel checking problem for
a special graph class. For a directed graph D = (V,A), a
kernel is a set of vertices K ✓ V which is both independent
and absorbant, i.e., no arc exists between any two vertices
in K (independence) and for any vertex u outside K there
is a vertex v 2 K such that uv 2 A (absorbancy). In 1983,
Berge and Duchet conjectured that an undirected graph G
is perfect if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
“If D is any orientation of G such that every clique of D
has a kernel, then D has a kernel.” Ma↵ray [11] proved that
the conjecture holds when G is the line-graph of another
graph H, i.e., when G represents the incidence between the
edges of H. Thus, for a bipartite graph H, whose line graph
G is always perfect, the statement implies that for acyclic
orientations in each clique D, when D trivially has a kernel,
G also has a kernel.
As Fleiner [7] pointed out in his thesis, the above argu-
ment implies the existence of a stable matching for bipartite
graphs, a theorem proved by Gale and Shapley [9]. To see
this connection, let H be the two-sided graph of a stable
marriage instance and let G be the line-graph of H, where
each clique corresponds to a set of potential partnerships of
an agent. The acyclic orientation of D is created according
to the preferences of the agents, if agent u prefers b to a in
the stable marriage instance then we have two corresponding
vertices, ub and ua in G and we orient this edge towards ub
in D. It is now straightforward to show that the kernels of D
are in a one-to-one correspondence with the stable matchings
of the marriage problem.
In a similar way, the pairwise comparison model with cer-
tain but intransitive preferences can be translated to the
problem of finding a kernel in a line-graph of a bipartite
graph. The orientation of the directed graph D should be
as described above. The problem of deciding whether a cer-
tainly stable matching exists in this model is equivalent to
the problem of deciding whether a kernel exists in the corre-
sponding directed graph. However, here, as the existence of
a certainly stable matching is not guaranteed, a kernel may
not exist either. The problem of finding a kernel in a directed
graph is NP-hard in general [4], and also for some special
graphs [8]. However, we are not aware of any result on the
complexity of this problem for the line-graph of bipartite
graphs. Note that this problem family was described in the
Open problem section of the EGRES research group [5]. We
state this hardness result in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The problem of deciding whether a directed
graph D has a kernel is NP-complete, even if D is a directed
line-graph of a bipartite graph.
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